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Critics of American politics often say that
spending on electoral campaigns harms our
democracy. They charge that the money goes for
cynical, negative, and misleading advertise-
ments that alienate the public from politics and
elections. 
Political scientists have collected and ana-
lyzed data on the connection between campaign
spending and civic life. The data bear on several
questions at issue in campaign finance debates:
Does campaign spending reduce public trust?
Does it reduce levels of citizen involvement in or
attention to campaigns? Does it lower citizens’
knowledge of information relevant to their
votes? Who benefits from campaign spending?
Studies indicate that campaign spending
does not diminish trust, efficacy, and involve-
ment, contrary to what critics charge. Moreover,
spending increases public knowledge of the can-
didates, across essentially all groups in the pop-
ulation. Less spending on campaigns is not like-
ly to increase public trust, involvement, or atten-
tion. Implicit or explicit spending limits reduce
public knowledge during campaigns. Getting
more money into campaigns should, on the
whole, be beneficial to American democracy.
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Introduction
For more than a decade, campaign
finance has been a topic of national debate
and, in 2002, legislation. Substantial scholar-
ly and public discussion has focused on the
contributions side of campaign finance: who
contributes, how much, and with what effect
on the making of public policy? An equally
important but underdeveloped discussion
examines candidate spending: what benefits
for democracy, if any, flow from campaign
spending? 
Positions on the latter question in the
public reform discussion have been clear. To
one camp, campaign spending is political
speech that deserves protection. More speech
means more information, and more informa-
tion produces an enlightened and active citi-
zenry. Candidates and parties rationally use
campaign spending to inform the public
about candidates’ policy preferences. By con-
tributing to the quality and quantity of pub-
lic discourse and by making political elites
accountable to the governed, campaign
spending builds political community.
Unlimited campaign spending is a boost for
democracy.1
To the other camp, unlimited campaign
spending undermines democratic values.
Legislators spend inordinate time raising
funds to create a bipartisan incumbent pro-
tection scheme that hobbles challengers and
grants access and favors to contributors.
Money is spent on cynical, negative, and mis-
leading campaign advertisements. The pub-
lic becomes skeptical or, even worse, apathet-
ic and uninvolved, and campaign spending
fails to enlighten or engage the public.2
Researchers have explored most of the
contentious points raised in the public dis-
cussion of campaign contributions. Research
on campaign spending, on the other hand,
has been narrower than the public discus-
sion, focusing largely on the extent to which
campaign spending contributes to electoral
victory. In this paper, I report on the results
of several studies I conducted that examine
the connection between campaign spending
and civic life. In particular, those studies
examine the connection between spending
and public trust, perceptions of efficacy (the
feeling that being involved in politics makes
a difference), levels of involvement in and
attention paid to campaigns, and electorally
relevant knowledge—all key components of a
vibrant political community
Despite the concerns of reformers, cam-
paign spending produces generally beneficial
effects. Campaign spending makes an impor-
tant contribution to key aspects of democra-
tic life, such as public knowledge, and does
not damage public trust or involvement.
The Effect of Campaign
Spending on Public Trust
and Involvement
The complaints about campaign spend-
ing are well-known. One frequent assertion is
that high levels of spending alienate and dis-
illusion the public. Does an individual’s
direct experience with campaign spending
affect his or her attitudes? Do large amounts
of spending in their own districts turn off
and disillusion potential voters? Campaign
spending does not have the dire conse-
quences for trust, efficacy, and involvement
that were alleged by critics of campaign
spending.
In a study of the 1994 and 1996 U.S.
House elections, my coauthor and I exam-
ined whether the level of spending in the
campaigns affected the public’s trust in gov-
ernment and the electoral process.3 In other
words, are citizens living in congressional dis-
tricts where campaign spending is high likely
to be more cynical about politics and elec-
tions than citizens living in districts where
spending is low? Merging the best available
national election public opinion data (the
National Election Studies, collected by the
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and
Social Research at the University of
Michigan) with campaign spending data col-
lected by the Federal Election Commission,
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we performed a statistical analysis to deter-
mine whether campaign spending was linked
to the level of public trust. The study con-
trolled for more than a dozen other factors
that might influence public trust; that way,
we could be certain that we were isolating the
effects of campaign spending from the
effects of other possible factors.
The results indicated that campaign
spending does not contribute to public cyni-
cism. When respondents were asked how
often they trusted the federal government to
do what is right, their answers were unaffect-
ed by the level of candidate spending. The
same result held when survey respondents
were asked whether people like themselves
had a say in what government does. Whether
campaign spending was high or low, people
were equally likely to indicate that they did
have a say in what government does. Direct
experience of high levels of spending does
not increase citizens’ cynicism about govern-
ment and politics.
On only one question did respondents dis-
play more cynicism when spending was high:
when challengers spent a lot in 1994, survey
respondents were more likely to say that the
government wasted a lot of tax money. When
incumbents spent more in 1994, however,
respondents were more likely to give a trusting
response, to say that government did not
waste a lot of tax dollars. Those results are not
surprising given the context of the 1994 elec-
tions. Republican challengers waged a particu-
larly vigorous campaign stressing common
themes across the country, and as they spent
more, that effort bore some fruit in the public
perception of taxes. Incumbents, mostly
Democrats, were able to counteract that by
spending more themselves.
We also found two instances in which
more spending boosted trust. Increased
incumbent spending in 1996 boosted public
perceptions that government is run for the
benefit of all rather than for big interests, and
higher challenger spending in 1996 made it
less likely that people believed that many
people in the government are corrupt. Those
two findings, neither of which held in 1994,
are less important than the general pattern of
the results: despite the assertions of critics of
campaign finance, higher campaign spend-
ing does not generate distrust and cynicism. 
Another charge related to the trust issue is
that higher campaign spending tends to dis-
courage citizen involvement in and attention
to campaigns. For public involvement, we
examined whether respondents in 1994 and
1996 said they cared about the election, dis-
cussed politics with friends and family,
talked to others about voting for or against a
specific candidate, and were interested in fol-
lowing the campaign. In only 2 instances (of
a possible 10) did we find that spending
diminished involvement, but, contrary to
arguments made by critics of spending, it was
higher challenger spending in 1994, not
incumbent spending, that decreased the like-
lihood of caring about the election or dis-
cussing politics with friends and family.4
Again, the pattern of results is more impor-
tant than the results in those two specific
instances: in general, there is no statistically
significant relationship between campaign
spending and public involvement or atten-
tion. The criticism that large amounts of
campaign spending dismay the public and
discourage people from being interested in
campaigns is incorrect. 
Notably, the amount of incumbent
spending had no significant effect on the
public’s involvement or attention levels. The
argument that citizens are turned off by
high-spending campaigns simply does not
hold up when those high-spending cam-
paigns are in citizens’ own districts. Scholars
have found this kind of result in many are-
nas: people are critical of Congress, but they
tend to praise their own members of
Congress; people say the nation’s education
system is in crisis, but they generally rate
their local schools highly; people say crime is
spiraling out of control, but they say they feel
relatively safe in their neighborhoods.
Campaign spending apparently works much
the same way: citizens may, almost by reflex,
respond negatively when asked about cam-
paign spending in the United States general-
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ly, but when we look at how high levels of
campaign spending in districts affect people
in those districts, we find that high spending
does not diminish their involvement or
attention. 
The Effect of Campaign 
Spending on Public 
Knowledge
Critics often deride campaigns as exercis-
es in manipulation, but analysis of the effects
of campaign spending suggests a more posi-
tive interpretation. Higher campaign spend-
ing produces more knowledge about candi-
dates, whether measured by knowing the
candidates’ names, being able to place candi-
dates on ideology or issue scales (the survey
respondent is, for example, asked where he or
she would place a candidate on a seven-point
ideology scale if one end of the scale is labeled
“extremely liberal” and the other “extremely
conservative”), or confidence in the place-
ment on the ideology scale. For 20 measures
of knowledge, we found that there was a sta-
tistically significant relationship between
spending and knowledge. On 18 of those
measures, spending boosted knowledge; only
on 2 did spending decrease knowledge. The
effects of spending are overwhelmingly posi-
tive, and they are particularly strong for chal-
lengers. That is, both incumbent and chal-
lenger spending produces boosts in knowl-
edge, and challenger spending is more likely
to do so. Those tendencies were essentially
linear, meaning that we did not see evidence
that knowledge boosts would fade out at any
particular spending level. The upshot is that
setting a cap on spending by incumbents or
challengers would likely produce a less
informed, less knowledgeable electorate. 
For example, we found that when chal-
lenger spending was at its mean level of
about $230,000 in 1996, about 49 percent of
respondents in the relevant districts could
place the challenger on a seven-point ideolo-
gy scale.5 At $500,000 of spending, the per-
centage rose to 66; and at $1,000,000, the
percentage jumped to 85. The percentage of
respondents certain that their placement was
correct also jumped from 20 to 31 to 53 at
these three challenger spending levels.
We found similar effects for specific
issues. For example, if an incumbent spent
around $210,000 in 1996, about 36 percent
of the public in the district would be able to
place the incumbent on an issue scale for
abortion. If the incumbent spent $1,500,000,
about 53 percent of the public would be able
to locate the incumbent somewhere on the
abortion issue scale. The same pattern holds
for challengers. If a challenger spent around
$210,000, about 13 percent of the public
would be able to place that candidate on the
abortion issue scale. At $1,500,000, however,
the percentage jumps to 53, the same as for
incumbents. We find similar results when
looking at defense spending and government
services and spending, the other issue scales
available in the National Election Study.
Increased spending also affects whether
respondents report likes or dislikes about the
challenger and incumbent, again suggesting
an information effect—as respondents learn
more, they may find that there are things
they do or do not like about a particular can-
didate, or they may find that some of the
things that they thought were true about
that candidate do not in fact appear to be so.
That again suggests a boost in public knowl-
edge.
One of the major concerns of critics of
campaign spending is that candidates
allowed to spend as much as they wish will
misinform and confuse the public, perhaps
even use campaign funds to create false
impressions about their true stances on
issues. We examined this charge directly in
our study and found that it is not persuasive.
By combining data on how an incumbent
has voted on bills in Congress (roll-call votes)
with the survey respondents’ placement of
the incumbent on an ideology scale, we can
see how accurate people are in their place-
ment of the incumbent. In other words, if a
respondent places an incumbent toward the
liberal end of the ideology scale, we can see
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whether the incumbent’s voting record has in
fact been toward that end of the scale. In our
study, we produce “loose,” “moderate,” and
“strict” measures of accuracy, with each pos-
ing a more difficult threshold before consid-
ering an individual’s placement of the
incumbent to be accurate.
The findings are encouraging. In 1996,
the more incumbents spent, the more accu-
rate respondents were about the incumbent’s
ideology according to all three of our accura-
cy measures.6 If incumbents hypothetically
spent $0 in running for reelection, about 23
percent of the public would be accurate
about their ideological placement (using, for
this example, the measure of “moderate accu-
racy” in the study). This level of accuracy
results from familiarity with the incumbent
from news reports during his or her term, as
well as other cues such as the party label.
Spending of $1,000,000 would lead to 49 per-
cent of the public being accurate; spending of
$1,500,000 would produce an accuracy rate
of 63 percent. This is a strong, significant
improvement in public accuracy. In 1994
incumbent spending increased accuracy
according to our “moderate” measure. For
the other measures, there was no statistically
significant relationship: additional incum-
bent spending does not make respondents
more accurate, but it does not “fool” the pub-
lic and make respondents less accurate,
either. In both years, challenger spending
tended to decrease accuracy about the
incumbent—the more challengers spend, the
less sure the public is about what the incum-
bent stands for. The challenger in a competi-
tive election wants voters to wonder how
much they really know about the incumbent;
campaign spending raises that question for
voters. The effect of more spending, then, is a
more reflective and aware electorate. As
incumbent spending pushes respondents in
one direction, challenger spending pushes
them in another. In short, incumbent and
challenger spending produces a more com-
petitive election. Limiting spending would
limit competitiveness. 
These results are consistent with those of
another study published in 1999.7 There, I
examined whether incumbents could use
campaign spending to distance themselves
from the public image of their party or from
their voting records. Could an incumbent
run away from the party label and from his or
her own voting record? Specifically, I investi-
gated whether incumbents could create a
more moderate image of themselves through
the use of campaign spending. The results
showed that incumbents could not spend
their way to a more moderate image than
their voting record would suggest. In fact, the
more incumbents spent, the less likely
respondents were to mistakenly place the
incumbent in the ideological center.8
Overall, spending does not make individ-
uals less knowledgeable, despite what critics
imply. Instead, we see substantial evidence of
spending boosting awareness, recall, ability
to perform campaign-related knowledge
tasks, and respondent accuracy.
Campaign Spending and 
Political Inequality
One fear often voiced by critics of cam-
paign spending is that such spending merely
perpetuates the advantages of the already
well-off. The logic is that candidates tend to
cater their appeals to the relatively wealthy in
society. The more money spent in campaigns,
the argument goes, the larger the informa-
tion gap between the well-off and the less-
well-off. Moreover, some citizens will pay
more attention to public affairs than will
others, and candidates will target their atten-
tion to those individuals. High-attention cit-
izens tend to have more education, higher
income, and higher socioeconomic status in
general. Again, the more candidates spend,
the larger the gap that emerges between low-
attention and high-attention citizens as can-
didates shower the attentive group with cam-
paign appeals—or so the story goes. As indi-
cated above, my research has found signifi-
cant knowledge benefits from campaign
spending. It would be alarming if those ben-
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efits were received disproportionately by soci-
ety’s most advantaged citizens, thus exacer-
bating the gap between social classes or
groups. 
The question of whether campaign spend-
ing disperses knowledge broadly across the
population or to more narrowly targeted
groups is tied to one of the most fundamen-
tal issues that has animated political science
scholarship for decades: does a particular
political practice enhance equality or foster
inequality? This is simple, direct, and pro-
foundly important to democratic theory.
My research suggests that, as with cam-
paign spending in general, the story is a rela-
tively positive one.9 In my study, I compared
the effects of campaign spending for a series
of group pairings, in which the first group
would be considered relatively advantaged
politically, economically, or socially and the
second group would be considered relatively
disadvantaged. The group pairs included
political characteristics (for example, strong
partisans vs. not strong partisans, contacted
by party vs. not contacted by party, voters vs.
nonvoters) and socioeconomic characteris-
tics (for example, white vs. not white, family
income in top 75 percent vs. family income in
bottom 25 percent, attended at least some
college vs. attended no college). I also created
a cumulative measure of advantage and dis-
advantage that combined four group charac-
teristics; the “cumulatively advantaged” are
advantaged in at least three of these charac-
teristics (high income, college education,
voter). 
I then examined several knowledge items
relevant to House campaigns, such as recall
of candidate names, placing candidates on
ideology scales, and placing candidates on
issue scales. Because much of the controversy
in campaign spending research concerns the
fate of challengers, I focused on the impact of
challenger spending on knowledge about the
challenger, comparing the impact for people
in the advantaged groups with the impact for
people in the disadvantaged groups. 
The results show that the benefits of cam-
paign spending are broadly dispersed across
advantaged and disadvantaged groups alike.
That is, as challengers spent more, members
of both groups gained in knowledge. For
example, with challenger spending at
$225,000 in 1996, 57 percent of members of
the “cumulatively advantaged” group could
place the challenger on a seven-point liberal
to conservative ideology scale. Forty-seven
percent of non–cumulatively advantaged
(“disadvantaged”) individuals could do the
same. If challenger spending increases to
$650,000, the percentages are 78 and 69 for
the two groups, respectively. With spending
at $1.3 million, the percentages leap to 94
and 90, respectively. This example shows that
increased spending produces real increases in
the knowledge of both the relatively advan-
taged and the relatively disadvantaged.
Moreover, the disadvantaged make real gains
on the advantaged. At $225,000, the ratio
between the percentage of the disadvantaged
(47 percent) and the percentage of the advan-
taged (57 percent) able to place a challenger
on the ideology scale is .82 (in other words,
the ratio of 47 percent to 57 percent is .82). At
$650,000, the ratio is .88. At $1.3 million, it is
.96. At that level of spending, the gap in
knowledge between the two socially disparate
groups has nearly evaporated. 
To take another example, at $225,000 of
challenger spending in 1996, 18 percent of
the cumulatively advantaged could place the
challenger on a seven-point issue scale for
government services and spending; 13 per-
cent of the disadvantaged could do so. The
ratio of the two is .72. At $650,000, the per-
centages increase to 35 and 26, respectively,
with a ratio of .74. At $1.3 million, the per-
centages are 67 and 58, respectively, with a
ratio of .87. Again, the more money spent, the
more both groups are able to perform this
task. The more the challenger spends, the
closer the ratio of the percentage of people in
each group that can place the challenger on
the scale. And this example shows that there
is clearly room for even more gains in knowl-
edge as spending exceeds $1.3 million. 
What both of these examples show is that
limiting challenger spending to $225,000, or
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$650,000, or even $1.3 million would have a
negative consequence in terms of public
knowledge and that the consequence would
spread across social, political, and economic
groups. Many other examples can be drawn
from the research to make the same point:
When more money is spent, relatively advan-
taged groups do gain the benefit of more
knowledge, but, particularly critical for
democratic elections, so do relatively disad-
vantaged groups. Increased knowledge about
the candidates does not disproportionately
flow to privileged sectors of society, bypass-
ing less privileged sectors. Campaign spend-
ing has the effect (through campaign ads,
contacts, and other organizational activity)
of dispersing knowledge broadly across the
public, to relatively disadvantaged as well as
advantaged groups. The more that is spent,
the more equal groups become in their
knowledge levels. Low levels of spending,
therefore, lock in inequality of knowledge
between groups. Campaign spending, rather
than strengthening and entrenching political
inequality, is a democratizing force.
Involvement and 
“Negative” Politics
Skeptics allege that high-spending cam-
paigns often reduce voter participation by
encouraging candidates to rely on “negative”
ads. Political science research, however, tends
to dispute that point. Most studies have con-
cluded that negative ads do not demobilize,
and may to some extent even mobilize, the
public. The authors of a meta-analysis of
more than 50 published articles bearing on
the topic report that they “uncovered little
evidence to warrant the fears of those who
believe that electoral participation is imper-
iled by the increasingly widespread use of
negative political advertisements.”10
My research, based on the 1998 U.S.
House campaigns, concurs.11 Performing
analyses similar to those described above for
1994 and 1996, but also including spending
by political parties and special interest
groups and advocacy organizations as well as
candidates, my coauthor and I found that
more money spent on positive ads, negative
ads, or ads that contrast candidates in some
way typically does not affect the levels of pub-
lic trust, efficacy, or election involvement.12
A related fear has been that expensive
campaigns are necessarily more “negative” in
tone. That does not appear to be the case.
The correlation between spending on nega-
tive ads and total ad spending was .12 in
1998 and statistically insignificant. That
takes into account not only candidate spend-
ing but spending by groups and parties also.
The public will see more ads of all types in
expensive campaigns. On the flip side, nega-
tive ads will be present whether campaign
spending is low or high. 
Last, we found that more money spent on
contrast ads—which combine positive and
negative appeals—significantly boosted pub-
lic knowledge; positive ads more modestly
boosted knowledge. In sum, even if we ana-
lyze spending on particular kinds of advertis-
ing, rather than spending overall, we find
that high levels of campaign spending pro-
duce generally positive effects.
Conclusion
Political scientists have long thought that,
in terms of competitive elections, low levels
of spending can be problematic. z Ordinarily,
of course, incumbents have the spending
advantage. Congressional incumbents are
often quite good at what they do. They have
name recognition; they know how to use the
media; they know how to work on issues that
are of interest in the district; they take posi-
tions that are generally popular in the dis-
trict; and they know how to get things done
for the district and for individual con-
stituents. Challengers frequently need to
spend more than incumbents to overcome
those nonfinancial advantages of incumben-
cy. Challengers allowed to spend freely might
well topple incumbents, especially where
incumbents are weak and unpopular. When
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an incumbent is weak, of course, money will
tend to flow into the challenger’s campaign
more readily. Restricting that inflow makes
the job of displacing the incumbent that
much more difficult.
Campaign spending has been not only a
source of complaints about the reelection of
incumbents; it has also become a surrogate for a
wide range of problems in the political system.
Despite the volume of the public debate, there
has been little academic research focusing direct-
ly on the impact of campaign spending on public
trust, efficacy, involvement, and knowledge.
These are questions about our civic life that are
broader than the issue of who wins and who loses
elections. The series of studies reported in this
paper is a sustained attempt to track those link-
ages at the national level. The findings of those
studies show that campaign spending enhances
the quality of democracy and leads to a vibrant
political community. Spending does not dimin-
ish trust, efficacy, and involvement, contrary to
critics’ charges. Moreover, spending increases
public knowledge about the candidates, across
essentially all groups in the population, whether
“advantaged” or “disadvantaged.” The policy
implication of these findings is that low levels of
campaign spending are not likely to increase pub-
lic trust, involvement, or attention, but they will
tend to diminish public knowledge. Spending
limits, whether explicit or implicit, mean a reduc-
tion in the level of public knowledge during cam-
paigns. Getting more money into campaigns
should, on the whole, be beneficial, and there is a
range of methods—which would appeal differ-
ently to people of different ideological persua-
sions—by which those additional resources could
enter the campaign finance system. Campaign
spending benefits democracy.
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